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The history of citizenship is coterminous with the political history of 
modem western societies. The very idea of political representation opened a 
wholly new need to define the status and the political role of the people whose 
sovereignty did legitimize the power of representatives. Thus the concept of 
citizen ended up incorporating the main characters of the political transformation. 
Consequently, the concept has been particularly receptive of all changes in 
strategies affecting the state and its relations to society. From the original concern 
about membership—by way of defining who has the right to be acknowledged as a 
member of a society and the constitutional forms of such a right—the notion of 
citizenship has undergone the same modifications than the very content of the 
social pact. Here lays indeed the strength of T.H. Marshall's theory of citizenship. 
His reconstruction of citizenship's development—from civil to political and to 
social—shows a dynamics inherent to it, stronger than the rigidity of a strictly 
legal pattern of citizenship. Based on the evolutionary character of his model, 
citizenship has been often viewed in the sociological literature as nothing but a 
synonymous of modernization, democratization, and the like. To be critical of 
such evolutionary simplifications does not demand, however, to give up the idea 
of citizenship as a process of political transformation itself.
If citizenship is a process, more than a right, then it becomes all the more 
indispensable to reason on historical cases, since the components and rhythms of 
a transformation are not the same all over. As Turner [1990] claims, only 
historical analysis can lead to a theory of citizenship. A second need is equally 
strong: the analysis cannot be done through the juridical language alone, because 
this latter accounts for the codification of rights, but cannot explain the deeper 
dynamics through which rights and the social pact itself do change. Ferrajoli 
[1993] rightly deplores the lack of communication between legal and sociological 
analyses of citizenship, but at the same time he seems to overlook the fact that the 
modification of rights is a social, not merely a legal process. To the vagueness of 
the sociological literature on modernization and democratization, legal theorists 
tend to oppose a rigid definition of citizenship in its original meaning of 
membership into a political community [La Torre, 1995], as though such 
community—and consequently membership to it— had not undergone significant, 
strategical changes.
A way of interpreting citizenship which would avoid both, evolutionary 
generalizations and disciplinary oversimplifications is offered by the approach in 



























































































analysis of bio-politics [Foucault, 11979], Citizenship can be described as a 
strategy to govern processes of social change affecting political relations—namely 
a strategy to socially create citizens [Burchell,1995], Burchell stresses that 
thinking of citizenship as a social creation may help to avoid the oppositions 
dominating citizenship debates—between active and passive, public and private, 
bourgeois and citizen, community and the market. All these oppositions may at 
their best generate attempts to restore a better meaning of citizenship lost 
somewhere in the past, destroyed by the market and modem specialization. But 
they cannot account for "the key feature of modem Western citizenship seen as a 
product of self- and social discipline" [Ibidem: 549],
What is even more relevant here is a further effect of the govemmentality 
approach. It makes clear that citizenship is always political. The political nature 
of citizenship is not confined only in a peculiar step, when at stake are political 
rights; nor it is essentially visible through its juridical codification. Rather 
citizenship is political because it responds less to a need of just classifying 
people, than to a strategy of creating citizens through a set of practices and 
knowledges that govemmentality does mobilize. Thus, citizenship and citizenship 
rights do not limit themselves to express membership ties. They move along with 
changing conditions, expectations, criteria required for practising the role of 
citizen.
The marshallian case, out of British welfare history, is relevant because it 
brings on the table the case for social citizenship. Presented on an evolutionary 
scheme, however, social citizenship appears as being both, of the same nature 
than political citizenship, and yet non-political nor state-related. And indeed it has 
been often regarded as being rather the product of social actors, social 
movements, the equivalent of civil society sphere, and the like. I claim that the 
analysis of citizenship as governmental strategies in the development of French 
republic will prove, on the contrary, that social citizenship is deeply political and 
state-related; even more so, it has changed the whole relation to the state—via the 
administrative apparatus—as well as the whole definition of a good citizen. The 
treatment of poverty as a social question—where citizenship sustain the duty of 
the poor to participate but is in turn challenged because of their exclusion from 
rights—is the first political example of such strategical use of citizenship to govern 
problems of inequality, and at the same time the source of cmcial transformations 
in the social pact.
Social citizenship is nowadays under attack, consistently with attacks 
against social policies, social services and social rights. Similar attacks play on its 
claimed non-political nature: on one side, this maintains a sort of illusion that
Poor Citizens.





























































































social citizenship could be eroded without breaking the social pact; on the other 
side, reasons for such an erosion are allegedly only economic reasons, coming out 
of financial crisis of western states. This is particularly clear in the current debate 
on poverty. On the one hand, the issue of poverty is presented as politically 
neutral, just a matter of organizing market responses enabling to reduce public 
expenses. On the other hand, poverty tends to be identified with extreme poverty, 
the most excessive deprivation, a group apart where no rights are involved, rather 
only humanitarian concern. As a result, poverty is isolated from social problems 
of inequality and becomes social exclusion, while social rights and social 
institutions are generally weakened.
Part of the problem comes from the fact that current debate on welfare 
policies relies mostly on the analysis of the American welfare model and its crisis 
[Leibfried, 1990], This sort of "americanization" of European poverty analyses 
and social policies [Abrahamson, 1991] is particularly problematic from the 
vantage point of social citizenship. If European welfare systems have grown out 
of a political link between poverty and citizenship, opposing to an exclusively 
juridical liberal conception an argument for social citizenship1, by contrast in the 
United States a strong reluctance toward universalistic principles of social 
citizenship has created a "partial welfare state" characterized by the exclusion of 
large groups from social rights [Schmitter-Heisler, 1991],
The debate on citizenship, in turn, seems more willing to analyze problems 
raised from cultural differences and identities than issues of inequality addressed 
by social citizenship. The emphasis on 'multiculturalism' as the most crucial 
dimension of citizenship issue might well be the effect of a pressure from 
conjonctural policy-making demands. It still limits citizenship issues to civil and 
political rights, and stresses an interpretation of citizenship as a political relation 
to the nation-state. No doubt, enlarging or restricting membership 
acknowledgement is an important issue for minority groups; but recognition 
policies so popular in today citizenship debate cannot address inequality 
problems that such groups will experience still [Fraser, 1995], The social 
dimension of citizenship seems out of date; even though its unconcern with 
national ties could prove useful in strategies of integrating minority groups. In the 
end, the dominance of cultural obscures equality concern in citizenship debate,
'Freeden [1994] shows for Britain that the concept of citizenship came into play around the debate on the Old 
Age Pension Act at the beginning of 20th century, modifying a dominantly statistical interpretation of poverty 
by stressing its intrinsic social nature. A similar process had been taking place much earlier in France given the 





























































































Social Citizenship and the Crisis o f Welfare States
reducing the critical strength of social citizenship against the political limits of 
liberalism.
In this paper, 1 briefly describe how poverty and citizenship issues have 
been associated in France, within the frame of a general emphasis on citizenship 
since the Revolution of 1789. Then I shall draw on the historical case some 
developments toward a definition of social citizenship, both at the theoretical 
level (social rights) and the institutional level (welfare state), as a crucial aspect 
of our democracies. This should help to evaluate current analyses of the welfare 
crisis.
In a general way, nowadays attacks against welfare seem aimed to 
exorcize exactly that fundamental transformation from individual poverty toward 
a social question which had been influenced by citizenship issue and had 
organized social policies. After decades of welfare policies based on social 
citizenship, current attacks tend to undermine the idea that welfare would have 
any relation to citizenship, being in any way part of the social contract. The very 
idea of social citizenship is under a twofold line of attack: by strategies 
individualising anew problems of poverty, and by strategies individualising social 
risk. At stake, in this process that M. Reberioux [1994] has called decitoyennete, 
is something we had thought had been solved once for all: are the poor still 
citizens, or not? And the doubt goes either way: aren't citizens becoming poorer 
because of an erosion of social citizenship? The frailty of citizenship of the poor 
today is symmetrical to fragilisation of social citizenship for everybody. After all, 
it is no wonder, since "the history of citizenship entitlements is a history of 
freedom and not a history of compassion "[Ignatieff 1989],
Part 1
Citizenship And The Social Question In France.
At the turn of 18th and 19th century, the poverty debate in France shifts 
from mendicity to a "social question" as an important effect of the passage from 
the Old Regime to a liberal society. Between the mendicant haunting the Old 
Regime and the modem poor, the contrast is striking: the poor are no longer 
individuals, but "dangerous classes", the collective phenomenon of pauperism. 
What was once accepted as a sign of divine will, if not of election [Gutton 1974], 





























































































public obligation, now seems to be morally unacceptable. Even worst, poverty 
appears as a symptom of broken social ties.
Of course, the poor did not suddenly stop begging for food, nor did the 
Revolution break an essentially repressive policy toward mendicancy and 
vagrancy. On the contrary, in spite of strong opposition against hospitals and 
hospices, the institutions put in charge of them remained surprisingly the same 
[Rosanvallon 1990], The "dépôts de mendicité" were to enforce work among 
mendicants, while the 1810 Napoleonic Law defined mendicancy and vagrancy 
as crimes; assistance, in turn, relied mostly on private charity [LeRoux 1907:52], 
Notwithstanding the persistence of an old institutional apparatus, after the 
Revolution neither mendicity nor repression no longer exhausted the problem of 
poverty. Beside a traditional poverty surviving beyond the Revolution, poverty 
took on a new importance, rapidly turning into one of the greatest public 
questions. Why did poverty become a crucial issue to reflect on the bases of 
sociability, instead of simply bringing up to date assistance and repression 
institutions? What fundamental changes took place in the political rationale of 
poverty?
In my book on Gouverner la misère [1993] I have argued that such a shift 
in the conception of poverty did take place within the frame of a political 
transformation expressed by the concept of citizenship, eventually overcoming 
the universe of charity and repression which had been in charge of dealing with 
poverty problems during the Old Regime, typically with mendicancy and 
vagrancy.
As it is well known, the concept of citizenship was at the core of 
theoretical and political elaborations which were at the background of the French 
revolution. Citizen is above all l'homme libre [Condorcet], free to take part in the 
grand tout national [Sieyès], that is to participate [Rousseau] to the sovereign 
authority. Freedom, common rights and active participation are the crucial 
features of a citizen, against the political subordination and the pervasiveness of 
privilege in the ancien-régime society [Brubaker:39], In the revolutionary 
language, the title of citoyen took the symbolic aspect of the destmction of social 
orders and the privileges attached to them in the Old Regime society. It became a 
general attribute, practically synonymous of human being. Yet it was adding an 
important dimension to it: namely, that the moral person was no longer built 
neither against, nor independently from its social side, rather together with that 
condition of sociability that the city represents.
Within a literature on citizenship largely dominated by the British case, 




























































































Social Citizenship and the Crisis o f Welfare States
because of its strong link to the building of the nation-state. Therefore it is most 
often treated under the aspect of political citizenship. Brubaker [1992] stresses 
the national character of French citizenship through the revolutionary 
institutionalization of political rights as citizenship rights, transposed to the plane 
of the nation-state. In France, Rosanvallon [1992; 1994] emphasizes abstract 
equality as the specific content of citizenship in the French model; by doing so, he 
interprets the Revolution through a fundamental separation of politics from social 
demands and burdens. Yet, I believe Turner is right [1990:208] when he says that 
the very fact of going through a revolutionary process against the absolutist 
conception of sovereignty provided France with a highly articulated concept of 
citizenship, especially of active citizenship.
At the core of the concept of citizenship, alongside with membership in an 
abstract general state against corporate privileges, is a second element of a very 
different nature since it is to qualify the membership tie: useful work, as in the 
case of the producers who constitute the nation according to Sieyès. In his 
analysis of private activities as well as of public services, the nation coincides 
with the Third Estate only because his legitimate members are all individuals who 
carry the productive activities the nation needs. Such a moral central role of 
useful work is confirmed a contrario by the blaming of aristocracy, excluded out 
of the nation because of their idleness, and of course, symmetrical to it, of 
mendicancy and charity. If their attachment to privileges makes it difficult to 
imagine that aristocrats will ever be able to belong to the general state, useful 
work will redeem the poor transforming them into "useful and virtuous citizens", 
re-establishing a reciprocity of duties.
Useful work provides a critérium of citizenship without any other reference 
than the individual and the nation. It breaks therefore the image of a spiritual 
community, hierarchically organized and unified in the king's body, toward a 
society constituted as a nation of equal individuals, associated under the same 
laws, all committed to transform natural goods into consumption goods, for the 
greatest benefit of all. Utility becomes the very basis of morals, as the source of a 
right no longer based on forceful superiority. As Koselleck has shown, it is only 
through a moral legitimation that new claims against political despotism can be 
fostered. This demands that society is able to promote its own morals, to limit 
despotic political power. Thus the citizen becomes the depositary of such a moral 
consciousness rooted in social processes, as opposed to individual egoism. 
"L'esprit de citoyen", Turgot had already stated, was equivalent to the "noble 





























































































In the conceptual strategies of the revolutionary destruction of old 
privileges, citizenship is eventually the very plane of equality, the only one where 
equality is really thinkable of It expresses the right of everyone to enjoy the 
benefits of the association, above all the guarantee that all natural rights will be 
equally protected against the natural inequality of means. Reciprocally, only the 
equality of all citizens does legitimate the sovereignty of the nation. Yet, the 
concept of citizenship is caught in a fundamental contradiction due to its juridical 
origins.
On one side, citizenship is a universal attribute, a natural right of all 
members of society. According to Sieyès, citizens owe their right to influence 
collective decision to their common nature of citizens, and not to their 
differences, this is why he identifies them with the chose publique, the outcome 
of the common will of citizens. Universal citizenship is the political side of 
popular sovereignty.
On the other side, however, citizenship was never working politically 
otherwise than through distinctions, starting with the first distinction between 
active and passive citizens offered by Sieyès. Only as passive citizens all 
members of the nation share a natural right of citizenship; but citizenship as a set 
of positive rights opening the way toward "exerting an influence over the making 
of the law" is only the fact of active citizens. Of course, active citizens are a small 
minority: women, children, foreigners but also the poor are excluded. As a matter 
of fact, the notion of an active citizen eventually coincides with citoyen 
propriétaire, or actionnaire, a stock-holder in the business of society. If it is thus 
formally impossible not to be a citizen, the notion of citizenship is far from 
conveying a univocal meaning of membership. It tells that we are all members of 
the nation, but also that we are not all members in the same way. From this 
vantage point, citizenship is no longer a crucial means to attack privileges, it 
rather belongs to an attempt to organize new hierarchies, a new order of 
privileges.
Sewell [1992] points at the paradoxical figure of passive citizen: since the 
idea of French people becoming active participants in the public life is at the core 
of the notion of citizen as opposed to the subject, a passive citizen is a non-sense. 
In fact, it is a way to repropose subjects, whose passivity is the reverse of 
required qualities for active citizens: to be male, adult, French nationals and 
taxpayers2. As we see, it would be only too simple to explain these exclusions by
2Sewell analyzes the gender-based exclusion of women, and concludes to the "limited democratic vision of the 
Revolution's first generation of leaders" [1992:121]. The same could be said about the exclusion of the poor, 
that Robespierre denounced as the real aim of introducing passive citizenship. But there is more to say than 




























































































opposing within citizenship a formal level of equality to a factual level of 
inequality, as Rosanvallon tends to suggest. The contradiction is indeed internal 
to the very notion of citizenship, and this is what the treatment of the poor is to 
make clear. Under the new light of citizenship, the poor do not represent any 
longer marginal people excluded from society, but on the contrary these margins 
are the borders of inclusion. All are citizens, even the poor, morally autonomous 
individuals, subjects of indefeasable rights which sanctioned the end of privileges. 
It starts then to spread a concern about the role that the poor can play, or refuse 
to play, in a social game where they are necessarily included, since nobody can 
be excluded, though they will have the worst part. If the poor become a critical 
political issue for the new liberal society it is not so much for the inequality they 
are suffering but because they are equal to everybody else and it cannot be 
otherwise.
The new figure of poverty raises two kinds of problems for a liberal order. 
First of all, its link with economy: if poverty depends on the lack of labor, then 
policies to reduce poverty should inevitably intervene on the labor-market, 
therefore denying the neutrality that a free market economy demands to the state. 
Secondly, its link with rights: if labor is the only legitimate way out of poverty, 
then everybody is entitled to have an opportunity to work, and such entitlement 
should be protected as the rights to ownership. Yet this would make the state not 
only an economic actor but even politically responsible for a deficit of work; 
should the social contract include a guaranteed individual entitlement to labor, the 
state would increase its dependence upon popular consent. In such links with the 
economy and the rights lay the political intensity that poverty problems assume in 
a liberal society.
Social policies thus were organized following a strategy of depoliticization 
of poverty problems: protecting market and the state from interference and 
responsibility, by means of separating the issue of poverty from the issue of labor 
and of individual rights. To this purpose, the analysis of poverty focuses on the 
moral element promoted by philanthropy in the space opened between the crisis 
of classic economy model and the need for political legitimation of liberal order. 
It inspired a fundamental distinction: if poverty belongs to indefeasable laws of 
economy and is therefore ineliminable, a totally different question is pauperism, a 
less economic than moral kind of poverty that social reform ought to eliminate in 
order to re-establish a natural relation between wealth and poverty. Pauperism 
was a set of a-social habits and behaviors to be attacked by techniques of 
socialization [Villerme 1840],
Poor Citizens.





























































































All techniques directed to moralize the poor did intervene in the relation 
between poverty and the whole social body. It was by this relation that they 
judged what was moral or immoral. They did not seek for individual solutions, 
rather for an effect of socialization. Association, education, providence, 
mutualism, hygiene, were all aimed at producing social ties between individuals, 
in order to produce some cohesiveness, and therefore social stability. Poverty was 
described as a social pathology, health was identified with order, poverty with 
illness and immorality with contagion. It was to be stopped controlling the space 
surrounding the individual, where physical circumstances for moral improvement 
become effective. Immorality appeared as the fertile ground for the diffusion of 
social disorder and absolved social injustice. In this way, moral analysis of 
poverty was to influence significantly the administration of civil society—through 
Boards of health, direction of mines and factories, schooling, banking and the like 
[Lecuyer 1975],
The moral analysis of poverty assumed that the state had to be defended 
from an obligation toward the poor, as much as society from a danger of disorder. 
To this purpose, it emphasized the need to investigate the actual conditions 
underlying morality, enlarging thus its scope well beyond the narrow limits of the 
responsibility of the poor, rather using intervention on them as a way of 
moralizing the whole society. But the "moral interest" of society in reducing 
poverty [De Gerando 1839] referred to a moral collective rather than a 
contractual one enabling to acknowledge the indispensable role of the state in 
promoting socialization. Both effects lead beyond the subjective analysis of 
poverty and at the same time start to investigate into its social character.
The moral analysis of poverty however proved insufficient to depoliticize 
poverty problems, as the new revolution in 1848 was to show dramatically. In 
their claim for a "social republic", insurgents linked poverty to labor, and any 
solution to it to the acknowledgement of an individual right to labor and 
assistance. After all strategy of moral interpretation, poverty was regarded as 
linked to the economic and juridical bases of social system. The moral analysis 
was eventually only a provisional step toward a social analysis of poverty, and 
moralization turned into a large project of socialization. The political response to 
the revolutionary claims was to call for an authoritative foundation of social 
morality, more obligatory than voluntaristic moral ties. It was a call for social 
science.
The lack of "social sentiment", Auguste Comte said [1975, 2:659], 
demanded to promote a sociability that it would be vain to expect from laws and 





























































































Social Citizenship and the Crisis o f  Welfare States
rights", purely individual, he counterposed the "calm and rigorous determination 
of social duties", directly social [Comte, 1848], Moral stood then for 'social': 
social reform must promote social sympathy, "by beneficially transforming 
questions of rights into questions of duties". The Comtian concept of duly would 
organize morality in the "scientific phase", as the individual counterpart of 
scientific laws of society. Strategic distance between the moral and juridical 
interpretation of society's committments lay thus on more stringent bases than 
philanthropic ones. Social science elaborated on the moral element, in order to 
found assistance on an objective system of laws and social justice, instead of a 
subjective sentiment of charity. From the "moral duty" of society the way was 
opened toward the "social duties" of its members, replacing their individual 
rights, providing a social, non-juridical content to their citizenship.
As Henry Monod [1909], a Third Republic director of Public Assistance, 
put it later, either assistance was deemed a duty, or it was just a "virtue" of the 
state. The Republican creed considered assistance as a duty, and took over the 
task of transforming that conviction into a legal and institutional framework. 
Third Republic social laws at the turn of the century identified the social question 
with workers, work site and labor conditions, rather than poverty. To be sure, 
they responded in this way to a growing fear of the conflict between capital and 
labor, which was rendering state intervention in labor market and relations more 
acceptable to many [Stone, 1985], But more crucial to my perspective, they were 
to overcome the opposition between the rights and duties in a framework of 
social obligations regulated through a mechanism of social insurance. 
Socialization was promoted socializing risk and responsibility [Ewald 1986], By 
acknowledging that a gap between individualistic and solidary principles was 
active in transforming liberal societies, these laws eventually laid the bases of the 
modem institutional set of social services in contemporary France.
Part 2
Toward A Definition Of Social Citizenship
a. Social Citizenship And Social Rights
A social analysis of poverty came through In France little by little, by 
reacting to difficulties of individualism: charitable, economical and juridical. The 





























































































were promoted, an administrative state apparatus and the social sciences. A new 
field of policies, institutions and sciences was then promoted, the social, offering 
a framework to treat poverty separately from its economic implications (the labor 
question) and from conflicts about individual rights Its task has been to provide a 
rationale for governing problems of inequality in a society of equals.
Welfare policies arose from a strategy to stabilize economy and political 
power, well before than to improve the well-being of the poor, and they did so by 
de-politicizing conflicts related to inequality. Inequality was interpreted as a 
problem of socialization, the underpinnings for an administrative state were 
provided, individuals were inscribed in a framework of collective duties 
transforming citizenship regimes. But also modem democracies were deeply 
transformed by such changes: social welfare policies greatly modified relations to 
the state and between state and economy, denouncing liberal principles' 
insufficiency and enhancing democratic practices. I would like to use here the 
origins of French welfare policies in order to deeper investigate Marshall's 
theoretical definition of social citizenship.
Citizenship emerges progressively against medieval orders, contributing to 
a transition toward a social structure centered on individuals as subjects of rights. 
Modem contract is the key to its constmction: it is characterized as an agreement 
between individuals rendered free and equal by their status of citizens. But civil 
rights regulating contracts are not enough against inequality; even more, they are 
affected by inequality in so far it may create obstacles to the realization of the 
autonomy of the subject. They are indispensable to the functioning of a market 
society, but unable to assure it from the disfunctioning due to inequality. Civil 
contract provides the egalitarian foundations supporting the structure of social 
inequality. An equal juridical capacity cannot eliminate the need to act on the 
social structure in such a way as to effectively guarantee individual autonomy 
against the limits raised by social environment. Here lay the conditions for the 
dynamics of Marshall model: citizenship is only partially linked to civil rights, 
they only represent the contractual bases on which a social dimension of 
citizenship is taking shape.
We know the historical context in which his attempt was formulated: 
Marshall's intention to support social-democratic turn toward welfare state. Yet, 
the idea that in order to be a citizen of a polls and to fully participate in public life 
one needs to be in a certain socio-economic position has been largely shared. It is 
already in Tocqueville and in Stuart Mill. The traditional notion of citizenship is 
not independent of social and economic concerns. There are various grounds to 





























































































Social Citizenship and the Crisis o f Welfare States
as a source of instability, to the awareness that desperate need does interfere with 
deliberation, to the search for solidarity as a cohesive link among members of a 
society.
Marshall first stated in a systematic way that modem democracies have 
elaborated on such awareness, developing a specific citizenship regime, based on 
social rights. There are resistances to acknowledge that it is a citizenship issue at 
all. Massimo Latorre [1995] challenges the idea that social rights such as the right 
to education, to medical assistance, to a fair compensation and the like, have 
anything to do with citizenship. Given the fact that he defines citizenship merely 
as the legal status of membership in a political community, it follows inevitably 
that such rights do not belong to the field of citizenship. Yet, is it possible to 
define the citizen without referring to education? How and when education 
became an essential feature of the citizen, to the extent of being shaped in terms 
of a right and a duty? Furthermore: how did the right and duty of education 
change the nature of citizenship and the practices of citizens? These are all 
questions that legal theorists seem simply to reject as corruptive of the concept of 
citizenship, instead of trying to conceptualize the changes occurring in citizenship 
regimes.
This only deepens the need to define social citizenship. Part of the 
difficulty to do this comes from the evolutionary character of Marshall's model, 
presenting different forms of citizenship on a continuum. Given the dominance of 
political citizenship, one tends to deduce social citizenship from it—as though the 
same concept of citizenship was applied to social matters instead of political 
matters. As already noted, this might wrongly suggest that social citizenship is 
not political. Nor the reference to the community would be specific to social 
citizenship: citizenship itself, no matter how qualified, is characterized by an 
orientation toward the public space, a space not claimed by private ownership 
[Crouch, 1996; Somers, 1996],
Let try, then, to characterize social citizenship by defining the social rights 
on which it is grounded. Marshall regarded the 1834 poor law reform as 
alternative to a recognition of rights of citizens, because the reform did renounce 
to interfere with the functioning of free market (by means for instance of 
intervening on the wage system). Thus, also the residual relief to the poor was 
given only on the condition that the poor would give up their rights as citizen 
(internment in the work-house). Charity as well as work-houses were practices 
opposite to citizenship. So, what draws the line of an intervention on poverty 





























































































acknowledge that the market value of an individual is not the measure of his right 
to welfare.
Second feature. Marshall characterizes social rights, with respect to 
personal rights, as being public duties. Although a person is eventually enjoying 
the right, the aim really pursued through it is an improvement of society. His 
classical example is education. Compulsory education is according to him a 
genuine social right: the public duty of education does not only aims the benefit of 
the individual, but the benefit for the whole society. "Political democracy and 
scientific manufactures needed an educate electorate" [82],
French example provides an illustration of such a social character of rights. 
Social means that society is the legitimating reference, not social actors. A 
political process affecting the relation to the state is originated neither at the state 
level, nor at the level of individuals, but at the society level. It is what P. Costa 
calls a "sociocentric paradigm" in his discussion of citizenship historical models 
[1996], This requires that society is established as a subject of demands, needs, 
interests that are not identifiable with the ones coming from the state or the 
individuals; that society is acknowledged as the space where specific, necessary 
and involuntary processes take place. Something similar to Polanyi's account for 
what he calls "the double movement" of society.
The problem is that such a subjectivation of society was a long process 
taking shape through anti-contractualistic, anti-individualistic tensions in the 
institutional organization of a liberal society. Society was established as an 
autonomous field of knowledge and practices, vis-à-vis economic and juridical 
ones as the result of a deep criticism of the possibility to deduce parameters to 
organize the common good from the contractualiStic premises of liberal order. It 
is not just the market which cannot really work without some kind of protections; 
but society as a whole. Inequality problems are specifically apt to show this 
impasse, because of their difficulty to be governed in a society based on 
principles of equality. Because here lay a tension crucial to liberal democracies. 
In Marshall's formulation, social citizenship is a strategic answer to the conflict 
between a democratic orientation toward equality of rights, and capitalism 
valorization of inequality: at stake is the need to find a politically viable way 
toward a legitimized inequality.
Historically, the formalization of a status of citizen has been always 
challenged by attempts to reduce inequality, namely by poverty as a social 
question. The difficulty then is not external to the field of civil and political 
citizenship, which would work well for their part; it is inside citizenship itself, 




























































































Citizenship as a unifying concept is not only contradicted by the exclusion of the 
non-citizens, but has never worked otherwise than through distinctions, internal 
borders separating different categories of citizens, as we have seen with Sieyès 
concepts of citoyens actifs et passifs. Sewell lists four levels of citizenship in the 
Constitution of 1791 he had deeply inspired [1992:112], Functional exclusions 
only work at some conditions: that excluded people accept to be excluded, that 
they are entirely excluded—and cannot exert any influence on decisions 
establishing their exclusion, that they do not have other important functions. Once 
the social structure of inequality starts to be challenged, also political citizenship 
gets into crisis. When in 1848 Parisian people claim for "rights as citizens and 
rights as workers", they show to consider the political status of citizenship as 
being different from the social status of laborers—and they claim that both are 
equally essential to their membership in the Republic. Actually, this dissociation 
was not only in the claims of workers, but also in the political response to them: 
they got rights as citizens (universal manhood suffrage) in order to deny them 
rights as workers—the right to vote instead of the individual right to labor or to 
assistance. It would be naive to suppose that this did not in turn affect citizenship. 
The very extension of political rights modified the frame, and claims grew against 
the neutrality of liberal order asking for some policy of rights reducing inequality.
From the Physiocrats' tradition of "natural social right" (droit social 
naturel) to Condorcet, it is already at stake the need for some synthesis between 
the liberal conception of individual rights and the anti-contractualistic idea that 
society is necessary and involuntary—two possible sources of rights. Universal 
individual rights interpret equality and liberty, but are unable to organize the 
social unit since they cannot afford to regulate disintegrating levels of inequality. 
In a word, they fail to realize security. As a reaction, the search for security (to 
secure the realization of people's autonomy as well as to secure the survival of the 
association) has inspired a continuous attempt to re-establish a reciprocity 
between rights and duties, as a way of limiting the scope of rights in the interest 
of society. Oualitas personae is not enough to found the association.
Social rights address strategically this problem of founding society on a 
balance of rights and duties. They have therefore a very specific logic. Consider 
work. A distinction can be made between on one side the "droit de travailler", 
stating the freedom of working, a negative guarantee, and on the other the "droit 
au travail", the right to get the possibility to work, a claim for a service, for a 
positive guarantee. Now, if such a claim for positive services is the core of the 
social rights' logic, their nature is incomparable with subjective universal rights: 
they do not ask for more freedom from state power, they are not incompatible
Poor Citizens.





























































































with state intervention in assuring services. Above all, their legitimacy springs 
from two different sources: the individual and the society. There is thus no 
progression from civil and political rights to social rights, there is more than just a 
discontinuity, there is a real rupture, and such a rupture takes place within rights. 
And in fact in France the political resistance of liberals against the 
acknowledgement of duties, of positive guarantees and the like has been 
strenuous, from the Declaration of Rights during the Revolution throughout most 
of XIX century.
Critics of Marshall evolutionistic approach point at the fact that social 
rights are not of the same nature than civil and political rights. Such criticism can 
be addressed from a legal theory point of view, as Ferrajoli does [1994]: social 
rights are expectation rights, as opposed to autonomy rights: they present a 
substantial legitimation and call for a substantial democracy. They are not 
attributed to the citizen, but to the person, with a few exceptions—that we should 
try to further dissociate from citizenship, making all of them rights of the person. 
Once again, citizenship, for legal theory, is only substantiated by national 
belonging. The most problematic characteristics of social rights are the low level 
of procedural definition, and therefore of uniformity, and the high level of 
economic expenses they usually require. This put social rights under a critical 
light: they are too dependent on economic and political resources in order to keep 
up requirements of certitude and non-contingency. They are, for this reason, no 
rights, as Zolo puts it: they might indicate necessary social services, but they 
cannot transform into real rights — i.e. universal rights — any sort of entitlement 
to such services. So, critics claim that talking of citizenship about social rights 
would be illegitimate, since they have not the same normative strength of civil 
and political rights. They have not reached the state of universal rights, what the 
notion of citizenship would refer to; for this reason, the very notion of social 
citizenship would be nothing but confusing.
Yet distinctions do not prevent from governing through some strategical 
compositions. Take Ferrajoli distinction between civil rights concerning the 
person and political rights concerning the citizen, according to the legal definition 
of citizenship. Yet, we can account from a sociological point of view for the 
existence of a link between the two sorts of rights—that takes the form of the 
contract. Not only in the sense that the practice of political rights is conceived as 
a contractual relation; but also because the political contract is based on the same 
principles than the civil contract, namely liberty, equality and security (Procacci, 
1994). Civil and political rights might well be distinct in legal terms, they 




























































































reserved only to citizens able to fulfil the conditions for civil contract. The 
difference of social rights from civil and political rights can also be described in 
strategical terms, as their historical construction shows, leading to another 
conclusion than they just are no rights. Their different nature might have modified 
or broadened the scope of rights beyond the limits of liberal legal conception. 
And today’s problems of citizenship are indeed very hard to understand unless 
we take such a broader perspective.
Then, social rights are not just another category of rights added to civil and 
political but introduce a rupture in the field of rights. They have not only a 
compensatory, but also a legitimating function, they shift the claim for distributive 
justice from the state toward administrative agencies. During the French Third 
Republic, when social laws establishing social rights come along, they emerge 
mainly from an insurance principle translating them as "socialization of risk": 
individuals are entitled to social provision not as individuals, as though they could 
pretend to more qualitas personae, but as a member of an aggregation, of a 
collective body, by profession, by age, etc. The absolute character of universal 
rights is here replaced by the relative character of circumstances influencing the 
social life of people, such as accidents, old age, sickness. Strategy of social rights 
reinforces the intermediate institutions and weakens the state, in a very 
durkheimian perspective. They show that the complexity of the relation to the 
state cannot be expressed by the voluntaristic logic of the political contract, nor 
by an exclusively political notion of citizenship referred to it. We simply need not 
to reduce social theory contribution to indicate procedural ways of solving 
tension between contrasting principle at work in democracy, as sometimes it 
seems the case (Habermas). Procedures tend to replace only too often substantive 
reasoning and historical judgement in contemporary thought about democracy. 
Soc. rights have been much more that a procedural solution to the political 
tension between individual self-realization and social conditions to it; they have 
substantively opened a full new political space, becoming a stake for a continuous 
process of collective fighting.
Looking at social citizenship as a political strategy might help to 
understand some of the reasons why it is not too popular among today 
acknowledged problems of citizenship—namely, why it is underestimated with 
respect to multiculturalism problems. Interestingly enough, social citizenship is 
typically a citizenship status where nationality does not count—the tie has already 
been broken. It is somewhat surprising then that multiculturalist strategies 
overlook possibilities to use social citizenship. The reason lay, in my view, in the 
fact that historically social citizenship has resulted from a movement (theoretical,
Poor Citizens.





























































































political and social) of deep criticism against the political limits of liberalism; 
whereas today’s horizon of multiculturalism debate is deeply committed within 
the liberal order, limiting its criticisms to claims for a more open, more tolerant 
liberal society—that is for extending the same pattern of liberal citizenship. And 
second benefit of underestimating social citizenship: by doing so, we reduce not 
only citizenship, but also inequality to such extension of an established model of 
social stratification, referring problems mainly to relationships among societies, 
or cultures, rather than to internal systems of power hierarchies.
I do not mean that social citizenship was the revolution, rather exactly the 
opposite. It has represented a compromise solution, a sort of third way between 
pure liberalism (thinness of the laissez-faire) and socialist statism (thickness of 
state intervention). From this intermediate position, it has challenged liberalism, 
which was thus historically forced to cope with it. To treat citizenship only as a 
continuum with its contractualistic origins, as it is nowadays often the case, and 
to ignore changes occurred within citizenship itself, can only be an attempt to 
eliminate such challenge from the political construction of our societies.
b. Social citizenship and welfare
Welfare services constitute the institutional component of social 
citizenship. At the opposite of poor laws, welfare policies are based on the idea 
that assuring a minimum of well-being is not only necessary, but it demands to 
interfere with the functioning of free market, by substracting to it some goods 
provided under the form of public services. 20th Century rights to education, 
health and social protection are opposed to early practices and embodied in 
institutions based on the principle of expanded responsibility and shared risk.
Citizenship-based provision of welfare services means that living standards 
are assured to all members of the social community. Selectivity had connected 
services to resources, inspiring means tested access to them, provoking hostility 
and stigmatization of recipients as being inferiors. By contrast, citizenship-based 
welfare services are universal, avoiding stigmatization, supplication, and 
exposition to official discretion [Parker, 1975], This has meant enhancing the 
quality of the services provided (since they do not concern only the poor but all 
people), and more importantly opening to legislation the definition of standards, 
therefore giving to citizens the possibility of influencing choices and decisions. In 
this way the development of welfare systems has deeply transformed 
contemporary democracies, namely eroding the pervasiveness of market criteria 
to regulate social solidarity. It has transformed the role of the state, the relations 




























































































Thus, citizenship has expanded. It does no longer consist only in national 
belonging and political participation, but tends to coincide with all aspects of 
what means to be member of a given society. The right to welfare has become an 
essential part of citizenship as such, just as property and vote rights, integral to 
our sense of belonging [King & Waldron, 1988], Even more, citizenship has 
become itself expandable: M. Freedland [1996] has argued that social citizenship 
is determined to a significant extent by the nature and the character of public 
services provision. Welfare services are no longer a matter of relieving the 
destitute as for the poor laws, they rather build a system of expectations drawn on 
stardards of values independent from market.
Marshall's normative reason to associate welfare to social citizenship is 
less redistribution of income than equalization of status among citizens. We have 
seen, speaking about social rights, that equalization tends to reduce inequality to 
a legitimized level by strengthening, through equal access to common services, 
practices where people experience equality of status. There are other possible 
grounds to it, as we have already mentioned: assuring stability, organizing 
solidarity, etc. The important point is that all reasons ought to be others than the 
ones offered by both, the market and charity, against which welfare systems were 
originated.
We have seen that, among the three conditions for the realization of 
individual's autonomy, security was problematic. That security also means a 
minimum economic security has always been clear, since poverty has appeared to 
be an obstacle to realization of autonomy and therefore an obstacle to the 
realization of a market society of free subjects, it is clear. Civil and political 
citizenship did not ignore the problem; it was solved by denying citizenship to 
those who had no independent socio-economic positions [vonGunsteren, 
1978:29], that is, by exclusion. Once exclusions start to be challenged, and 
political citizenship to expand, new relations and new definitions of citizenship 
are looked for. If one does not exclude anyone but treats all as citizens, then the 
conditions for independence required by the status of citizenship become a public 
concern.
From this vantage point, citizenship has offered to welfare policies a more 
efficient frame than the market, allowing the realization of non-marketable 
services aimed to generalize acceptable living standards. Citizenship restores 
reciprocity outside market rules, where it is regulated by an exchange between 
money and services, and outside family relations, where it is regulated by mutual- 
aid. But of course also outside charity, where there is no reciprocity at all. This 
demands that society has acknowledged that some standards of living are
Poor Citizens.





























































































required, "irrespective of individual bargaining power" [Parker, 145], To 
formulate these standards in terms of rights does transform the dependencies that 
they try to solve into autonomy.
Despite all this, debate about the crisis of welfare states is nowadays 
dominated by the logic of economic rationality: within a resurgent market and 
monetarist approach, privatization of social services and "user-pays" philosophy 
seem sufficient to ground an essential rejection of welfare systems based on 
social citizenship rights. Yet, many authors notice that attacks on welfare have 
had so far little success, no matter how loudly advertized, and this can plea for 
the structural position that welfare has reached in our political systems and 
citizenship regimes. However, the basic logic of these attacks is rarely 
challenged, and is becoming a sort of popular truth. The political reasoning is 
reversed: inefficiency of universal rules. This leads to approach a general crisis of 
social regulations denying the need to find new ways of organizing social 
solidarity. Yet there is no evidence that non-universal services would enjoy more 
consent than universal ones.
Although it would be difficult to deny that welfare is in trouble 
everywhere, part of the problem comes from the dominance in the current debate 
on welfare crisis of the American model of welfare. In fact, Americans' refusal to 
acknowledge structural poverty [Gilbert 1983] has always limited the political 
impact of the social question. Built on "the stigma of receiving unearned 
benefits", American welfare never went beyond a "residual" conception, as 
Titmuss [1987] put it, of the public intervention in assistance matters, to 
temporarily replace such "natural" solutions as market and family. Even when the 
Great Depression revealed the need of a public i.iteivention to replace voluntary 
company programs, contributory welfare programs were reminiscent of private 
welfare, they explicitly rejected any goal of income redistribution [Quadagno, 
1984], and eventually substantiated a firm distinction between social security paid 
by workers and welfare given to the poor [Skocpol, 1988], The "undeserving 
poor", a moral category expressing the degrading nature of relief within American 
poverty discourse, was never eradicate by universal programs of social security 
[Katz, 1989], In fact American welfare has mostly dealt with social dependency 
rather than inequality.
As such, American welfare model has been quite different from the 
combination of full-employment policies, social security and assistance measures 
that Beveridge regarded as essential to a welfare state. Such a distance has only 
grown since the Second World War [Fano, 1988]; Korpi's distinction between a 




























































































evaluate it [Korpi 1983], The tendency nowadays to claim no contradiction 
between liberalism and welfare [Welch, 1989] encouraged by the success of 
Rawls does introduce even greater confusion. Nevertheless, welfare systems did 
not follow on a linear path out of that "utilitaristic sympathy" which was the 
liberal key to social justice. On the contrary, they required an autonomous system 
of values. As A. Sen puts it, social welfare is not a function of individual 
achievement [Sen 1986], And "self-sufficiency welfare" represents just a 
misdiagnosis of the crisis of welfare [Goodin 1988],
As Fraser and Gordon [1994] remark, social citizenship is practically out 
of use in the contemporary debate about welfare in the US. This is because of an 
opposition to acknowledge entitlements to social provisions, in the American 
culture social provisions remain largely outside the aura of dignity surrounding 
citizenship, and recipients of welfare are usually regarded with disrespect, 
stigmatized. Welfare has been more generally viewed as a threat to citizenship, 
rather than its realization. They suggest that this is the result of an overwhelming 
emphasis on civil citizenship, and within it, of an unlimited predominance of the 
contractual model, increasingly assimilating all forms of reciprocity, except for 
family ones. Such an hegemony of contract also means that all what cannot be 
assimilated by it is described as its exact opposite~i.e. unreciprocated charity. 
The US conception of welfare rests on this binary logic opposing contract to 
charity, which is at work in the distinction between contributory insurance 
programs and non-contributory public assistance, masking the fact that also 
public assistance is based on contributions—the difference being the way they are 
collected. According to this ideology, the current trend pushes toward 
assimilating welfare to contract, with forms of agreed obligation for the recipient 
to perform work or training activities. This is the result, the authors claim, of the 
absolute mythology of civil citizenship.
Yet, we tend to think too often the content of civil citizenship as 
exclusively natural. In fact, although not an economic concept, the very basis for 
citizenship to regulate inclusion and exclusion has been, alongside with the 
national tie, "useful work", useful to the Nation—as we have seen from the French 
case. This is also the reason why the poor have raised a problem; they could not 
be integrated through their active contribution. In fact the contract, as the central 
pattern for civil citizenship, refers explicitly to the restructuring of work relations 
under a free market model [Castel 1995], It does demands not only habits and 
virtues, as Veit Bader says [1996] but above all work—a peculiar virtue, to say 
the least.
Poor Citizens.





























































































We do not need to recall Karl Polanyi's all story about what he called the 
"double movement" of societies, compensating market with non-market 
institutions. But it is important to remind the work-and-market content of social 
citizenship, as to investigate relations between citizenship and welfare. This is not 
an undue extension of an exclusively juridical concept to socio-economic matters. 
Citizenship itself is a more complex concept, having a juridical definition shaped 
on a social form of labor relations, and therefore a socio-economic application 
and relevance. Social citizenship is then expressing all what could not go under 
the contractual form of citizenship, non-contractual compensations indispensable 
for a market-oriented citizenship to function. In this way, it means that the 
relation to the state in our societies is by no means only a juridical and contractual 
relation, but a much more complex one.
Reduction of citizenship to contract cannot be the only normative ideal of 
citizenship. There are people for whom this normative ideal might just be too 
difficult to match; therefore, this argument can only lead to a bipolarization of 
people between the ones who are able to take advantage of déstructuration of our 
systems of social protection, and those who cannot profit of it and will only 
experience being in a more vulnerable position [Castel 1995],
The conjunction of welfare with citizenship has been the motor of a 
transformation of welfare, leading from a traditional paternalistic paradigm where 
government defines welfare needs, to a social rights paradigm where a new 
consumer based community voice may emerge to determine needs [Culpitt, 
1992], Social citizenship enhances public action, and presents citizenship as a 
way of acting, more than a way of being. This is also why it can be dissociated by 
nationality, because it is related to public activity rather than to a moral quality. 
Welfare services often need to be better organized; what they do not need is to 
loose the crucial role of citizenship at the center of modem political debates on 





























































































Social Citizenship and the Crisis o f Welfare States
Part 3
Social Citizenship Under Attack
a. Individualisation o f poverty: are the poor still citizens?
The socalled crisis of the welfare state is nowadays putting into question 
not only the extension, but also the maintenance of social citizenship institutional 
setting. The political argument has been reversed and a fundamental doubt seems 
to surround nowadays practices of social rights: rather than favor the realization 
of citizenship by eliminating the burdens of poverty, they might impede it by 
keeping the individual in a situation of subordination, simply by participating into 
a system of social protections.
Current analysis of poverty, particularly under the influence of the US 
debate, does contribute in a substantial way to breed such a skepticism toward 
social citizenship institutional provisions. From a cultural-biological emphasis in 
conservative analyses, to an insistence on the condition of ethnically delimited 
inner-city ghettos in a more progressive perspective, we assist to the conjunction 
of different conceptual strategies. Rooting the origins of poverty in the 
character or the biology of the poor, replacing identified targeted groups of 
population by an indistinct category as poverty, identifying the all of poverty 
problems with the extreme form of a growing marginalization, all are ways of 
individualizing problems of poverty and denying their collective nature. In this 
way, current analysis of poverty ends up to put into serious question something 
which had appeared as granted all the long of the realization of welfare 
institutions: namely, that the poor are citizens just as everyone else, and have 
therefore the right to some standards of living considered essential to the relation 
of citizens to their society.
In the present sociological debate on poverty, we assist to a regain of 
economic analysis. Economic versus social interpretation of poverty helps to 
vanish the idea that poverty can be referred to universal standards of economic, 
social and cultural well-being to which everyone is entitled. Poverty does not 
seem to be any longer a social problem but the result of an individual choice. 
Arguments against welfare take a revolving way, more than welfare a "revolving 
door".
Poverty is most often treated as an absolute phenomenon of a statistical 
nature, settled upon a poverty line based on the cost of a food basket, eventually 
bringing the analysis back to economic data, usually referred to income 





























































































line, a critical point is that income or consumption data do not account for social 
implications of poverty: not only the exclusion from material welfare, but also the 
social degradation confirming the idea of a common nature between poverty and 
delinquency. At best, economists can argue about income deficiency and suggest 
income transfers even though, as A. Sen forcefully shows, the loss of income do 
not capture the main problems of being left without a job. They cannot propose 
long term antipoverty policy, since they do not consider inequality the 
consequence of economic and political power distribution within a society. They 
can only provide more or less adequate, but always contingent, responses to a 
problem of poverty which is not considered as a political problem.
The big role played by economics has left the space for recasting the social 
analysis of poverty in a subjective frame, sustaining interpretations of poverty 
origins in terms of culture o f poverty. On one side, poverty has very little to do 
with income, as C. Murray says. The "working poor" [Murray, 1987] he is 
searching does not exist, only because he assumes that there is no labor-market 
problem, not there should be any responsibility of it in creating poverty, if only 
one is ready to work hard. The point is that work here stands for a "work ethic", 
something like "an opportunity to join the nation's mainstream" [Reischauer, 
1987], Not to work is classified as a "rebellious" and a political action, from a 
work-ethic state enforcing competitive work [Kaus, 1986], Symmetrical to such 
"culture of work" is a "culture of poverty". M. Katz [1989] shows how this 
concept bom in the 1960s to express liberals' attempt to escape moralizing 
classification of the poor, was in fact embedded with middle-class culture 
standards and in the end failed its purpose. The poor were described as passive, 
just as in the tradition of the "undeserving ooor", and then kept apart from 
movements fighting for civil rights. Teenage pregnancy, family patterns, 
reluctance to work, propensity for drug use and crime are only features of 
"passive poverty in the inner city" to whom welfare works as another "addiction": 
to accept welfare is thus an unequivocal sign of "incompetence" of the poor to 
self-support [Mead, 1991], The idea of individual responsibility of the poor is 
forcefully revived: the poor are "making choices", Murray says. Moral, ethnic or 
cultural, consideration of the "characteristics of the poor" means centering the 
analysis not on work, but on the work-motivation of poor people. In this way, 
poverty is separated from labor problems, especially unemployment.
As a matter of fact, according to the conservative critique arguments on the 
subjective culture of the poor should explain social inequality better than any 
structural hypothesis about labor. Fox Piven and Cloward [1972] have already 





























































































Social Citizenship and the Crisis o f  Welfare States
blamed on the poor. Today critics go a step further: "government must persuade 
[the poor] to blame themselves" [Mead, 1986] While one can object that there 
are no assured means to persuade the poor or to influence their characteristics, it 
is important to stress that individual responsibility of the poor is not a wrong 
response, it is just a response that excludes social policy, and therefore increases 
the 'risk of poverty' within our affluent societies.
A reaction against both, the increase of poverty and the reduction of it to 
cultural problems has led more recently to emphasize concepts like underclass, 
today dominant in poverty debate, where the structural components of poverty 
due to de-industrialization are put forward. If only "hors-statuts", drop-outs and 
the like are the dominant poverty problems, only people representing the extreme 
point of an inequality process already at work in fact well before such an extreme 
state, poverty becomes the target of policies only aimed to restore locally some 
kind of "human" condition.
Bom as a purely economic concept, indicating the persistence of poverty in 
spite of after-war economic growth, it has acquired new meanings: to the 
temporal dimension originally characterizing it, a behavioral and a racial 
dimension were added mainly through its mediatization, identifying it with blacks 
and to a lesser extent hispanics in inner-cities ghettos—particularly to some 
behaviors in matters of sexuality, family, school, job and the like. In this way, 
underclass has found again the ambiguity of cultural definitions of poverty. 
Though in the recent years social sciences have tried to take it back to the 
structural phenomenon of persisting poverty, focusing on the "black male 
joblessness" analysis [Wilson, 1987], they have centered the analysis on inner- 
cities ghettos and eventually reinforced the association of underclass with the 
black poor, adding to the concept a further spatial dimension. The emphasis on 
ghettos' concentration and social isolation as crucial factors of persisting poverty 
does orient the empirical definition of underclass toward behaviors: being 
surrounded by other poor can only reinforce behaviors, towards marriage, job, 
school, and the like. In the end, underclass tells us much less about the suffering 
of being poor in an advanced society than it tells us about sexuality, family 
models, job or school refusal, propensity to crime violence and drug abuse. Little 
by little, the analysis shifts from the causes of poverty to the behaviors of the 
poor as being the problem.
To resort to class terminology is not enough to restore a picture of poverty 
socially constructed. Wilson himself likens underclass to the concept of 





























































































But can behaviors offer a criterium to define a class? what about similar 
behaviors in other classes, or different behaviors among members of the same 
class? Moreover, underclass does not refer to any theory of social division, nor 
tries to build one such theory: the underclass is a class out of the structure of 
social classes, defined by itself, with no relation to other classes whatsoever. For 
this reason, it does not allow to conceptualize social stratification, nor explains 
relations between the social structure and inequality, first of all poverty. 
Sociologically vague, underclass has all characters of a moral category, and falls 
into the difficulty of providing with behavioral norms which would not simply 
reproduce middle-classes standards. The very idea of a class being under all other 
classes and without a relation to them does reinforce indeed the idea of the poor 
as being passive, according to a long tradition of moral interpretation of poverty.
Underclass's success comes from being close to common sense: it is a 
recomforting notion, making poverty the problem of a minority of people, and 
allowing the analysis to neglect more difficult issues as growing inequality of 
incomes among working people. But it can only lead to rehabilitating strategies 
and not to stmctural reforms of market or redistribution. As L. Mead puts it, since 
poverty is no longer a question of inequality among classes, "a politics of conduct 
is today more salient than a politics of class" [Mead, 1991:4], Underclass has 
been criticized as an ideological effect of dominant classes [Bagguley & Mann, 
1992], But more than this, underclass helps putting the ghetto poor apart from 
society, apart from citizenship. Barbara Schmitter-Heisler [1991] remarks that the 
lack of institutions supporting social citizenship rights, in the US comparatively to 
European countries, has favored such an exclusion from citizenship.
Recently, Wilson himself has acknowledged that "concerns about civil and 
political aspects of citizenship in the US have overshadowed concerns about the 
social aspects of citizenship [.. .] because of a strong belief system that denies the 
social origins and social significance of poverty and welfare" [Wilson, 1990:49], 
and that Americans tend to be more concerned about the social obligations of the 
poor than about their social rights as American citizens. Welfare programmes in 
the US have concerned mainly the working and middle classes, and had virtually 
no effect on the poverty rates among the non-elderly. The same thing can be said 
of policies enhancing political and civil rights of minority groups, which have 
benefited above all to small groups of better-trained and educated members of 
such groups. Therefore, "the economically weakest members of the urban 
minority population have remained excluded from mainstream society" [58],
After having practically ignored it in his influential book on the underclass, 




























































































and the weak institutional structure o f social citizenship rights in the US might 
have been a cause of economic deprivation and social isolation of the urban poor. 
As a consequence, he advocates for a development on race-neutral programmes 
enhancing social rights for all groups, better able to alleviate problems of poor 
minorities than race-specific measures. He quotes Donald Moon, to state that the 
aim is to enable "everyone to achieve full membership in the community, and to 
participate in what a particular society has come to regard as valued and 
worthwhile ways of living". But this seems rather likely to lead toward 
eliminating reserved quotas more than any other effect. Class confinement does 
not seem to be contested: welfare services reserved to the poor will be separated 
by services for the middle class, Medicaid will continue to pay doctors much less 
than other insurances, social citizenship rights will be still out of reach.
Wilson crucial contribution to revigorate a pseudo-scientific concept as 
underclass has reinforced an analytical tendency to stress the limits of citizenship 
ties, and to define behaviors incompatible to them, that keep the poor out of the 
realm of citizens. Given the impact that the US debate on poverty has had in 
Europe in these years of rethinking about European welfare states experience, 
some similar analytical strategy has taken ground on this side of the Atlantic. The 
notion of social exclusion (exclusion sociale) largely dominates poverty research 
particularly under the impulsion of European communitarian institutions. In spite 
of some differences, this notion shows most of the strategical features of 
underclass. As a matter of fact, it is not as a class that the exclus are tom from 
society. They are indeed a group apart, but the notion of social exclusion is a 
purely negative one: they have no positivity whatsoever, they represent only a 
breaking down of the social fabric (fracture sociale), they have no common 
interests, they are not the nouveaux proletaires [Rosanvallon, 1995b], There is 
no collective identity to describe, only individual trajectories; classification 
becomes less important, and statistics less telling. So the debate becomes a 
subjective one as in the States, centered on individual paths and, reciprocally, on 
personalized treatment, versus the impersonal character of general provisions.
To reduce poverty to a problem of social exclusion might sound a call for 
re-inclusion into citizenship—and indeed many progressive analysts would 
pretend it is so. But at the same time, treating them as excluded brings the 
analysis outside the sphere of the "city". This means that poverty is analysed as a 
condition on the margins, of drop-outs, and becomes the state in which one lives 
if one falls outside society, rather than a predicament which can occur within
Poor Citizens.





























































































society—the condition of marginalized people, rather than a process of inequality 
rooted in the social structure.
But social exclusion is also sociologically significant. It describes a social 
desegregation, the breaking-point of social relations. Intervention against 
exclusion must foster social integration (professional, family, community) in an 
holistic concept of society with all problems of normative models of performing 
integration. Individual trajectories of marginalization, to which individual 
trajectories of reintegration do correspond.
Social exclusion does transform a process into a condition, the condition of 
the excluded. Describes a dual society (ins-outs), and so doing it confirms the 
break of social relations. It pretends to eject out of society problems producing 
poverty. Vulnerability, precarity of labor, reduction of resources, weakening of 
social protections: all processes pushing polarization of society well before falling 
into extreme poverty.
The kind of policies that social exclusion has implemented are mainly 
characterized by a turning social problems into urban problems, where they take 
a specific feature of urban structure, that is replacing inequality by segregation 
[Touraine 1991], Therefore, the unique meaning of citizenship at work in such 
policies is local integration. Citizenship, or the lack of it, become from this 
vantage point a question of sociability, at the most of active animation; a culture, 
an identity, a set of behaviors whose frame is the urban location where the 
exclusion takes place. Going back to localized treatment of social problems might 
be a way of reorganizing the social exchange in a more individualistic way, 
activating reciprocity on a territorial basis, against abstraction of universal rights 
[Castel 1995:470], Yet localism also implies a twofold illusion: that contract can 
be enough for social integration, in spite of long opposite historical evidence, and 
that decentralization can be a remedy against all evil. Localism does not respond 
to the resentment of being no longer treated as citizens; it only reinforces the 
sense of exclusion by pretending that problems of the poor are no longer a 
collective issue, a public concern.
Amartya Sen's theory of poverty centered on capabilities and functionings 
[1993] is often interpreted as shifting from income-based analyses of poverty to 
consumption-based analyses. In fact, it does claim much more than just such a 
shift to a different set of data In an analysis inevitable relative in terms of 
income, he introduces anew the idea that there is an absolute component of 
poverty, in terms of what kind of life one can achieve, that capabilities and 
functionings express. Poverty is absolute in so far we have chosen a system of 




























































































most crucial for poverty and citizenship issues is according to Sen to consider 
participation as such a value, and capability to participate an integral part of well­
being impossible to renounce [1992], He shares with Marshall the conviction that 
poverty if not inequality has to be eliminated. But participation is exactly what the 
association of poverty and citizenship issues had been focusing on; in a situation 
where poverty is more and more the cumulative result of several levels of 
marginalization growing on themselves, an active defence of social citizenship 
can only inspire policies aimed to reinforce participation.
b. Individualization of Risk.
Social citizenship is under contest well beyond the debate on poverty 
issues. Actually, if the status of citizens of the poor appears to be again 
questionable, the erosion of social citizenship institutions affects social rights in a 
much more general way. In the critique of the welfare state, citizenship has been 
considered as expressing the normative ideal of an individual freedom, and 
therefore being intolerant of social rights and social services, of their 
administrative organization, of the very idea of universal standards.
Indeed, the crisis involving our social institutions is not just financial, but a 
more general crisis of social regulations on the all [Gauchet 1993], The share 
between universal principles and particularism is no longer assured, and needs to 
be reformulated. If citizenship bears the meaning of the relationship to the 
collective body, to a public space, then citizenship is deeply involved in such a 
crisis—which might explain its overstated presence in social sciences debate. The 
question is how we interpret such a crisis and what kind of solutions are we 
trying to imagine to it.
According to Rosanvallon the failure of welfare systems comes from the 
very search for universal, general criteria of social regulation. "La redéfinition de 
l'Etat providence passe par cette révolution cognitive [...] il faut aujourd'hui 
donner congé à l'homme moyen de Quételet et au fait sociologique de Durkheim 
et rendre aux données leurs valeurs individuelles" [1995b:210], Among the first 
effects of such individualization, crucial to the welfare state is the failure of the 
principle of social insurance having regulated until up to now health and social 
security. Social insurance has been a mechanism for organizing social solidarity, 
among people and among generations; its strength came from a historical and 
political process of socialization of risk and responsibility [Ewald 1986], It is this 
process, according to Rosanvallon, which undergoes decomposition nowadays, 
given the erosion of wage-labor on which it had been focused.
Poor Citizens.





























































































The result would be that social problems are today no more conceived of 
as a risk, they have become a-cyclical constant components of social life. This 
provokes a general decrease in uncertainty, which had been, as the Rawlsian veil 
of ignorance, the condition for socializing risk. The only aspect decoded in 
"social" terms is cost; we share expenses, more than we look for shared services. 
Accordingly the crisis of welfare systems would come from an individualization 
of risk, by now exploded in an unlimited number of individual trajectories. This 
would lead to a civic versus insurance-based organization of welfare, having to 
find each time a conjonctural rule, no longer universal rules of justice. There is no 
theoretical solution, only practical solutions; differences become legitimate, risk 
is only individual, the concept of a victim is nowadays the most adequate, and the 
agreement on justice rules which have become utterly conventional has to be 
found each time in the civic community. As a matter of fact, this exhausts also the 
political plane: politics consists in this constant search for instant rules to 
redistribute a solidarity for which there is no general principle. This is the basis 
that Rosanvallon proposes for an "active welfare state". This new political culture 
aims to overcome the coincidence of social progress with reduction of socio­
economic inequalities by developing procedures (droit procédural) centered on 
the principle of "fairness of treatment": to individual trajectories, individualized 
responses decided through some kind of judicial "case-by-case" agreement.
We land no far from claims leading to a politics of recognition and 
strategies pursued by those social policies referring to quotas, reverse 
discrimination, and the like. Interesting enough, no such policies have been 
implemented toward the poverty problems, they only refer to groups identified by 
gender, cultural or ethnical differences with respect to mainstream groups 
dominant in social power. They raise a question not in terms of exclusion-versus- 
inclusion, but of discrimination in the name of a non-economic, non-social 
element. Is there no discrimination toward the poor?
It seems that discrimination can be acknowledged only when it does not 
question in a fundamental way the structure of inequality, but rather only points at 
the structure of opportunities; and of course, opportunities are not the first 
concern in dealing with the poor, who by fate seem to have no access to the 
harvest of opportunities that our societies do promise. The next step of my 
research will be to explore the rationale for such policies, and the fundamental 
distinction they seem imply between inequality—as poverty, and difference—as 
discrimination of minority groups.
It coincides with the distinction that Nancy Fraser presents in her article 




























































































stmcture. She describes the political tensions attached to a fight against socio­
economic injustice, and the search for group differentiation responding to needs 
for cultural identity. The interesting point of her analysis, is that she does assume 
that such a contradiction is ineliminable, since it is experienced by everyone 
insofar every individual in a modem society has several identities. To find out 
new political alternatives becomes then inevitable. Contradictory tensions are at 
work, and always have been, in citizenship as a historical construction and a 
social fact. They cannot be solved by just eliminating one part of them—namely, 
social provisions; nor can they be exorcized in order to maximize private freedom 
and personal responsibility, since there is no evidence no more today than ever 
that they can be achieved without citizenship entitlements. Tensions rather 
demand for new answers, both theoretical and political, able to account for the 
need for new forms of universal principles.
Poor Citizens.
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